Introduction

In the past ten years twelve Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises and cities have built new stadiums and four more are under construction. At least in the short run, these new stadiums with rare exception have increased team revenues, fan interest and local pride. It is argued, therefore, that the Red Sox can do the same by replacing Fenway Park with a new stadium. But replacing Baltimore’s non-descript Memorial Stadium with groundbreaking Oriole Park at Camden Yards and replacing storied Fenway Park with what would be the sixteenth Camden Yards sequel are two entirely different propositions.

Fenway Park is the Red Sox’ greatest asset; it brings the team exceptionally strong revenues and an enduring historic legacy. Fenway Park is also a cultural landmark, the most exciting ballpark in the majors and an integral part of what makes Boston special among American cities. The same cannot be said of the stadiums replaced by other teams in recent years. Renovating Fenway Park is a worthy and proper way to satisfy the economic needs of today’s professional sports while respecting a community’s need to hold onto and maintain a place dear to its heart.

The Red Sox, their fans and the city of Boston would be better served by a renovation of Fenway than by the construction of a new stadium. Here’s why…

Working to save Fenway Park ranks among the most noble of undertakings available to anyone who believes in a real and potent American History. Of civic buildings in our country, none is rarer: only two early twentieth century ballparks remain. Fenway is one, and in all its crazy imperfections, in spite of its neglect, even in the face of its seeming antique obsolescence, it is absolutely perfect.

Howard Decker, Chief Curator
National Building Museum, Washington, DC
Fenway Park is Baseball’s Third Most Profitable Stadium

Many believe that because Fenway Park is historic, it is economically obsolete. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. An analysis of figures released to Congress by the Commissioner of Major League Baseball in December 2001 reveals that Fenway is one of baseball’s highest revenue producing stadiums. Chart I derives total stadium revenue for major league teams from the team-by-team revenue information provided by the Commissioner’s office. Among the figures released by the Commissioner, two categories of revenue—“game receipts” (commonly referred to as ticket sales) and “all other local operating revenue” (which includes concession sales, luxury suite rentals, club seating sales, stadium naming rights, in-stadium advertising and parking revenue) —together constitute total stadium revenue. The figures indicate that Fenway Park ranked fourth in Major League Baseball in total stadium revenue in 2001.

Yankee Stadium, built in 1923 and renovated in 1974–75, led the major leagues in total stadium revenue. Among the thirteen stadiums opened since 1990, Fenway Park ($119,228,000) trailed only Pac Bell Park ($128,697,000) and Safeco Field ($132,078,000). But in net revenue, which is what really counts, Fenway surpasses even Pac Bell. The San Francisco Giants pay $20 million annually in debt service on loans taken out to build Pac Bell. Thus, today’s Fenway Park is the third most lucrative stadium in baseball, more profitable than Camden Yards, Jacobs Field, Pac Bell Park, Coors Field, The Ballpark in Arlington, Turner Field, PNC Park, Miller Park, Bank One Ballpark, the former Enron Field, Comerica Park, and Wrigley Field.

Safeco Field’s performance in 2001 is indeed impressive, but it is very likely an anomaly. Safeco is in the midst of its ‘honeymoon’ period—the first few years after a new stadium opens when stadium revenues are at their absolute peak. Camden Yards once topped Fenway in revenues but is now far behind. In 2001, the Mariners got off to a great start, led their division from wire to wire and finished with the best record in American League history. It is unlikely that they can repeat that performance year in and year out. The Mariners also benefited from the largest public stadium subsidy to date, $372 million, which has enabled them to minimize their stadium construction debt. The Red Sox cannot expect to be so fortunate in the public subsidy department. Not only was the previous owner’s effort to obtain a similar subsidy of $352 million rejected by the Boston City Council, but the downturn in the economy has caused local officials who were once supportive to take a new look at subsidies for the Red Sox. Citing a “very tight budget” the Mayor of Boston recently stated that public funding for a new Red Sox stadium is off the table. As impressive as Safeco’s 2001 performance was, Fenway Park before renovation was almost equally impressive; after renovation it should easily top Safeco Field in revenues.
### CHART 1 2001 Team-By-Team Stadium Revenues
(as of Nov. 25, 2001) (in thousands of dollars) (unaudited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Regular season Game Receipts*</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Other local operating revenue**</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total Stadium Revenue</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<td>9,264</td>
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</table>

| Consolidation | 1,383,458                    | 827,815 | 2,211,738          |
| League Avg.   | 46,115                       | 27,394  | 73,725             |

% of Total Stad. Rev. 63% 37% 100%

*Source: Major League Baseball
Data available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/stories/2001-12-05-focus-expenses.htm
**Includes in-stadium advertising, naming rights, parking, concessions and premium seating revenue.
Chart II lists all of the revenue figures and the payroll figures released by the Commissioner’s Office in December 2001. Fenway Park’s strong revenues also helped the Red Sox finish fourth in 2001 in total team revenue, behind only the two New York franchises and the Seattle Mariners (and two of these teams went deep into the playoffs in 2001). Fenway’s third-in-the-league net revenues also enabled the Red Sox to field a team with the highest payroll in baseball in 2001.\(^5\)

No team with such healthy stadium revenues has ever increased them by building a new stadium. With revenues so high the chance of increasing them is small while the risk of a reduction in revenues is great. New stadium debt would significantly cut into team revenues. The Red Sox predicted an annual stadium debt payment of $19 million for their proposed Boylston Street stadium.\(^6\) At that rate, the team would have to experience revenues significantly greater than the 2001 revenue level of every new stadium just to keep pace with Fenway Park’s current net revenue level.

A look at Fenway’s current ticket prices shows in part how a new Red Sox stadium cannot be as successful for the Red Sox as new stadiums have been for other teams. New stadiums are in large part vehicles for increased ticket prices. Teams find it hard to significantly increase ticket prices from year to year when delivering the same stadium product, but after constructing a new stadium substantial increases follow. The three new stadiums of 2000 increased their ticket prices an average of over seventy-five percent. (See chart)

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<td>103%</td>
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<td>Consolidation</td>
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<td>Up 76.2%</td>
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### CHART II  
**2001 Team-By-Team Revenues And Expenses Forecast**

(as of Nov. 25, 2001)  (in thousands of dollars)  (unaudited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Regular season game receipts</th>
<th>Local TV, Radio &amp; Cable</th>
<th>Post Season</th>
<th>All other local operating revenue</th>
<th>Local operating revenue</th>
<th>National revenue</th>
<th>Total operating revenue</th>
<th>Player compensation &amp; benefit plan</th>
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**League Average**
- 46,115
- 19,037
- 1,518
- 27,594
- 94,264

**% of Local Rev.**
- 48.92%
- 20.19%
- 1.61%
- 29.27%
- 100%

But the Red Sox already have the highest average ticket price in baseball. They could not possibly raise their ticket prices seventy-five percent, especially since it is Fenway’s iconic status that makes higher ticket prices possible (the second highest prices are maintained by another historic venue, Yankee Stadium). No team with such high ticket prices has built a new stadium because the ability to raise prices is so limited. This points out once again that there is very little upside for the team while the risk of no longer being able to maintain current net revenues looms large.

Indeed, a new Red Sox stadium would have to be so spectacularly successful financially – significantly more successful than any other stadium ever built – that profiting from a new stadium would be nearly impossible for the Red Sox.

In the usual sports stadium scenario the team leaves behind an unloved and under-performing stadium for a new venue constructed largely through the use of public funds, with all stadium revenues flowing to the team. The Red Sox’ situation is not at all like this. A new Red Sox stadium is much more of an economic gamble. Not surprisingly, it was risk that killed the Boylston Street stadium plan — a generous public subsidy second only to that garnered by the Seattle Mariners, proved insufficient to counter the risk of uncapped overruns on land purchase and clearance costs, stadium construction overruns, reduced revenues and excessive debt.
It is a myth that the Red Sox can match the Yankees in revenue by building a new stadium. Due to the size of the New York media market, the Yankees’ media revenues top the Red Sox’ by tens of millions of dollars. (See Chart II) If the Red Sox somehow manage to generate more net income from a new stadium, the Yankees only need to dip into their excess media revenue to counteract this. As a result, the Red Sox have no chance of catching the Yankees in total revenues, but a distinct chance of falling further behind if they leave Fenway Park.
New Stadium Revenues Soon Decline Dramatically

Game receipts (ticket revenues) are by far the largest and most important category of stadium revenue, averaging 63 percent of stadium revenues and a staggering 49 percent of all local revenue. (See Charts I & II) During the 2001 season Fenway Park was second only to Yankee Stadium in game receipts, bringing in $89.7 million dollars. Fenway’s ticket revenues surpassed Camden Yards by an astounding $36.5 million and nearly doubled those of first-year stadiums Miller Park ($46 million) and PNC Park ($48.6 million). Other revenue totals include $76.6 million for Safeco Field, $69.5 million for Jacobs Field, $67.1 million for Pac Bell Park, $62.1 million for Turner Field, and $54.0 million for Coors Field.

Game receipts are of course very closely tied to attendance, a fact that means that Fenway’s extraordinary lead over new stadiums in this category will only grow in coming years. Experience has shown that new stadiums bring their teams higher attendance and revenues for only a few short years. Before long, the novelty wears off, interest declines, and attendance and revenues fall. ‘Honeymoon’ periods vary in length; attendance at Jacobs Field is just beginning to decline while the ‘honeymoon’ periods of Comerica Park and Bank One Ballpark were alarmingly brief. But the unmistakable trend is a significant drop in attendance after a relatively short period of a few years. (See accompanying chart) For new stadiums that are not funded almost entirely by local government the ‘honeymoon’ will be over long before stadium construction debt is retired.

Contrast this with Fenway Park where the trend is toward increased attendance year after year. In 2000 the Red Sox broke their all time attendance record; in 2001 they broke the record set in 2000 even though they had a better win/loss record the previous year. Fenway’s popularity is growing each year. Not surprisingly, with honeymoon periods ending elsewhere and Fenway drawing more than ever, baseball economics expert Professor Robert Baade of Lake Forest College, in analyzing MLB stadium revenue figures for the past ten years, found that the performance of Fenway Park relative to other stadiums is improving over time.

Eleven baseball stadiums and a number of indoor arenas and football stadiums have been constructed since Camden Yards opened in 1992. With so many new stadiums in America the novelty of being a city with a new facility has worn off. The ‘honeymoon’ period for the most recently opened stadiums is shorter than it was when having a new facility was something special. While at Camden Yards it took ten years for attendance to drop below 90 percent of its opening year level, it took only five years for
this to happen at Coors Field (opened 1995) and Turner Field (1997), two years at Bank One Ball Park (1998) and only one year at Comerica (2000). Unfortunately, for some of these teams, as their attendance declines their stadium construction debt payments remain constant for the twenty to thirty year life of the construction bonds.

Fenway Park’s popularity translates into strong pre-season and advance ticket sales as well. This means that the Red Sox receive more ticket proceeds earlier than other teams, providing the Red Sox’ front office more financial flexibility. In the spring, while most teams are wondering what their seasonal game receipts might be, the Red Sox have much of their hefty ticket sale proceeds in hand.

A sophisticated statistical analysis of stadium attendance and team performance has found Fenway Park to be the only major league baseball venue with strong attendance irrespective of team performance. Since 1967, the Red Sox at Fenway Park have drawn above the major league average in attendance every year but one (97 percent in 1984). Of the teams that have been around since 1967, only the L.A. Dodgers have done the same; and only the Yankees and Cardinals (five and six subpar years respectively) have come close. By drawing well in good times and in bad Fenway is like money in the bank for the franchise, providing a guaranteed revenue stream. The Red Sox should take pride in and promote the baseball-centric nature of Fenway Park, which maintains a loyal and knowledgeable fan base. Fans will continue to respond to a franchise that puts sports first and minimizes sideshows, gimmicks, deafening music and orchestrated group cheers.

It is significant that none of the new stadiums replaced a ballpark ranked so high in game receipts. With ticket revenues this strong the small chance of increasing them is outweighed by the greater risk of losing ground in this area, especially once the stadium’s honeymoon period ends. Moreover, no new stadium matches the level of ticket revenue of today’s Fenway Park; it is unreasonably optimistic to think that a new Red Sox stadium can do what no new stadium has done before and keep doing it year after year.
**Reason Three**

**Fenway Park Delivers The Best Baseball Experience**

“The Monster, the triangle, the scoreboard, the light tower Big Mac bashed, the left-field grass where Ted once roamed – it all defines to me why baseball is such a magical game.”

— Jayson Stark, ESPN.com 3/30/01

None of the new stadiums replaced a stadium as popular, special and legendary as Fenway Park. New stadiums may be famous for the food they serve or the amusement rides they feature, but none is famous for creating the kind of fan interaction and excitement that Fenway does. Fenway brings fans right in on the action. With its quirky angles, famous Green Monster and a patina of baseball and Boston history, Fenway Park is an electric venue. With every game there is the excitement of just being in a special place. There is a unique and unmistakable energy about Fenway Park.

There is also a unique beauty. People remember and often recount their first visit to Fenway when they were awed by the experience of ascending the concourse ramp into the light and emerald green glow of Boston’s baseball cathedral.

Many players want to play for Boston because Fenway crowds are the best in the game. Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciapara recently spoke on the value of Fenway to the home team:

“There are a lot of players who talk about playing here because it can be the best place to play. If some things were modernized, it can be that way overnight. With the passion and the intensity of the fans in Fenway right on top of the players, we should have the biggest home-field advantage in the game. I sense it when things are going well, [opposing] players come in, look around and think, ‘this is going to be tough ...’”

Players and true baseball fans love Fenway because Fenway is all baseball. Tom Seaver summed it up with perfect simplicity, “Fenway is the essence of baseball.” The bratwurst may be better in Milwaukee, but the baseball is better in Boston’s Fenway Park. Fenway offers unique connections to the past. For decades Fenway Park has been the focal point of summer nights in New England, an
experience we share not only with each other but with those who have come before us and hopefully with those who will follow us. The introduction of Ted Williams at the 1999 All-Star Game was especially powerful as he returned to the very field he had shared with the other greats of his day. “It is a place where visitors can see the invisible murals that have been painted and left behind by the men who have played there in years gone by.”\textsuperscript{18}

Only through a sensitive renovation can we hope to retain the authentic Fenway experience that makes it a pilgrimage site for so many baseball fans. One lesson that has been learned through the construction of so many new stadiums is that the Fenway magic cannot be replicated. For fans who want to experience a 1990s-style stadium the options are many; if Fenway is replaced, however, a one-of-a-kind baseball experience will be lost forever.

For more perspectives on Fenway see Appendix A
Fenway Park Is Central To Red Sox Mystique

“Take the team out of Fenway Park and they’re no longer the New England Red Sox.”

—Curt Gowdy

The Red Sox are an authentic New England institution largely because they play their games in the genuine article, not a Disney-esque replica. In today’s homogenized, mass-marketed world, a unique, differentiated product is a valuable one.

None of the new stadiums replaced a ballpark so unique, recognizable and integral to team image and prestige as Fenway Park. The aura of tradition that Fenway lends to the Red Sox also translates into a loyal and ardent regional fan base, a large national (and even international) following, and strong merchandise sales. Fenway Park is steeped in warm associations of tradition and simpler times. Lose the warm associations and lose it all – the mystique, the lure, and the special flavor.

Fenway is perhaps the most significant contributor to the powerful Red Sox brand, as noted in a recent Boston Business Journal op-ed piece. “The Red Sox brand…is tied intimately to Fenway Park. The team offers a consistent product (a reasonably competitive team) in a familiar place, passing itself off as something between entertainment and a cultural experience.”

The incredible value of the Red Sox brand caused the Red Sox franchise to sell for twice that of any other baseball franchise in history. Replacing legendary Fenway would be like taking a world-renowned restaurant with the most appealing ambience and turning it into just another Applebee’s. It would be troubling for team finances for a unique and legendary franchise, purchased at a dear price, to be transformed into a common, undifferentiated franchise that can no longer fetch such a premium. Renovation, on the other hand, will only enhance and reinforce the history, tradition and unique legacy of one of baseball’s oldest and most storied franchises.

The serviceable but unmagical Fleet Center has taken luster off the Celtics and Bruins, diminished the experience of attending a professional hockey or basketball game in Boston and reduced our city accordingly. Regardless of whether the Boston Garden could have been upgraded to modern standards, Fenway Park can be—as will be discussed discussed in this document.
Significantly, the two recent scenarios where teams replaced clearly historic ballparks produced the two least successful new stadiums. In Chicago and Detroit, new stadiums severed the teams’ ties to their celebrated past and impaired the teams’ ability to benefit from these important connections.

In 1991, the Chicago White Sox replaced historic Comiskey Park (opened in 1910) with a stadium of the same name near the site of their old ballpark. Last season, the new Comiskey drew 850,000 fewer fans than Fenway Park and grossed a mere $57 million—less than half of the income Fenway Park generated for the Red Sox. After a four year ‘honeymoon,’ attendance at new Comiskey fell below attendance levels at historic Comiskey. Meanwhile attendance and revenues across town at 1914 Wrigley Field have never been better. Interestingly, the Cubs, having watched the demise of the White Sox from close at hand, now plan to renovate and expand Wrigley, and the White Sox are also in the process of renovating the new Comiskey—they are trying to make it more like the old Comiskey they foolishly abandoned only eleven seasons ago.

Detroit replaced 1912 Tiger Stadium in 2000. The Tigers moved into Comerica Park after a much publicized ten year effort by Tiger fans to avoid the mistake that the White Sox had made in replacing Comiskey. This year, Fenway drew 700,000 more fans, and generated nearly twice the revenues of brand new Comerica ($119 million to $63 million). The Tiger’s are also paying off their stadium construction debt. (Albeit a debt that pales in comparison to debt the Red Sox would face.) What was the result of all this? The Tigers payroll in 2001 was $57 million while the Red Sox’ payroll was more than double at $118 million. The ‘honeymoon’ period for this unpopular replacement for Tiger Stadium never materialized. Comerica had the worst first year attendance of any recent stadium and its second year attendance dropped 24 percent from its dismal inaugural season despite a reduction in ticket prices.

Today’s standard seating configuration can be quite a shock to fans accustomed to the intimate setting and close-to-field seating of historic ballparks. Tiger Stadium opened the same day as Fenway Park and had also placed fans close to the field. Joe Falls reported on a tour of Comerica Park that the Tigers provided to local media before the new stadium opened in 2000. Mr. Falls, who reported that he had favored the decision to build Comerica, was unsettled by his first look at new stadium. “The tour…took about an hour and as the group of writers was leaving I collared three of them from around the state and said, ‘Give me your strongest impression.’ All three, amazingly, said the same thing: ‘The seats are too far away’…I began to get a clammy feeling about what they had done.” The new Comiskey and Comerica Park indicate that fans leaving behind an historic venue do not flock to today’s standard new stadium in the same fashion as those moving from concrete doughnut stadiums built in the 1960s and 1970s.
Contrary to some reports, renovation would cost significantly less than a new stadium. This is largely due to the fact that any new stadium would require the acquisition and preparation of approximately fifteen acres of land. The cost of land acquisition and clearance associated with the plan to build the proposed Boylston Street stadium, for example, was originally pegged at $140 million but later estimated to be as much as $200 million dollars. It is this very component of the plan that was deemed too expensive and too risky for the team’s bankers, causing the plan for the Boylston Street stadium to be shelved.26 Beyond land purchase savings, further savings in both labor and materials can be accomplished by retaining portions of the existing ballpark (the field, lower seating bowl and bleachers in particular).

There have been assorted Fenway Park renovation plans developed by various architects and firms. The three most recently developed plans are particularly noteworthy for their scope, detail and responsiveness to the team’s needs. The Wood + Zapata plan, the Llanes plan and the Decker plan (so named in recognition of the lead architects of each design) utilize only the current site of Fenway Park and adjacent land already owned by the Red Sox and incorporate construction phasing plans showing how renovation can proceed while the team continues to play at Fenway Park. The three plans are detailed in Appendices B, C and D.

Each plan has also been cost estimated and each would cost less than a new stadium. The cost of the renovation plan developed by Wood + Zapata Architects for the new ownership group is pegged at around $300 million.27 The Llanes plan was costed at $266 million and the Decker Plan at $160 million to $180 million.28 By comparison, the stadium component of the Boylston Street stadium plan was estimated to cost $352 million.29

Even when the value of the land that Fenway Park now occupies is factored in as a credit against the cost of a new stadium, renovation is still significantly less expensive. And unlike a new stadium, part of the cost of renovation may be recovered through tax credits, an historic easement and a legislatively authorized grant available for renovations of sports and cultural facilities that together could total as much as $47 million.30 Add to the cost of a new stadium the interest on financing the extra costs and the savings for renovation increase. The accompanying chart compares the cost of the most expensive renovation plan
with the cost of a new Waterfront stadium. As there is no formal proposal with documented costs for either a new Waterfront stadium or a renovation of Fenway Park at this time the figures in the chart are just estimates but they are sufficient for comparative purposes.

Lower cost means less risk. A ten percent overrun on a $250 million project would add half as much as a similar overrun on a $500 million project. Lower costs also make financing easier to obtain and reduce the annual payments necessary to retire stadium debt. As established in the discussion of **Reason 1** above, it is critical for the team to keep debt payments from cutting into or overwhelming any new revenues.

Stadium-related transportation infrastructure costs may be less for a renovation as well due to the proximity of a bus hub at Kenmore Square, the Yawkey Station on the MBTA commuter rail line and several “T” stations within an easy walk of Fenway Park (Fenway, Kenmore, St. Mary’s, Museum of Fine Arts, Ruggles Station). Infrastructure investment in the Fenway area can be leveraged to provide more public benefit because a renovation would call for accommodating fewer than 10,000 new patrons, while in a new location upwards of 40,000 new visitors would need to be accommodated.
Reason Six

Renovation Will Efficiently Address Team Needs

What is necessary in assessing Red Sox stadium requirements is a careful analysis of needs, risk and cost. A review of the figures in Chart I indicates clearly that the challenge for the Red Sox from a stadium revenue perspective is to maintain exceptional game receipts while increasing other stadium revenues. The Red Sox are second in baseball in game receipts, but at the league median in other stadium revenues. Their third-place finish in net stadium revenues overall is due to the fact that revenues other than game receipts are the less significant portion of total stadium revenues for major league franchises. Professor Robert Baade stated in his recent review of the Red Sox’ stadium situation, “Due to the fact that stadium revenues exclusive of gate receipts are relatively unimportant, attention must be paid to how much debt it makes financial sense to take on in an attempt to increase them.”

There are four things the Red Sox might hope to gain by building a new stadium—greater concession sales, more premium seating, a larger seating capacity and increased fan amenities and comfort. Renovation is a less risky, more cost efficient way of obtaining these four goals.

Concession Revenue: Fenway Park lags behind most new stadiums in concession sales. Concession revenue is not nearly as important as game receipts and net concession revenue is a relatively small portion of total net stadium revenue. Still, increasing the current level of concession revenue at Fenway Park can be done in a number of ways as demonstrated in the various renovation plans put forth to date. A key component of all such plans is to construct facilities on parcels of land the Red Sox already own which directly abut the current ballpark in three locations. These areas are highlighted on the accompanying graphic. Major new amenities (food and merchandise points of sale, restrooms) can be easily added in these areas without impacting the existing ballpark structure. This means that the cost and logistical complexity of adding concessions can be controlled. And in this way concessions can be added without negatively impacting the special character of Fenway Park. Even more points-of-sale can be attained through a redesign of Fenway’s grandstand concourse areas. These improvements can also lead to more efficient management of concession services.
Luxury Suites & Club Seating Revenue: Premium seating revenues generated by Fenway Park today are very respectable. Fenway Park has 44 luxury suites, two party suites and about 600 club seats. The Red Sox believe the local market can support as many as 100 luxury suites and about 5,000 club seats. The optimum number of luxury suites and club seats for the Red Sox is a matter of some uncertainty, however. Teams that have new luxury seating-laden stadiums may regret an excess of premium seating in slower economic times. In Boston, the Fleet Center and CMGI Field have added numerous luxury suites and club seats. As a result, Boston may soon reach, or may already have reached, the point at which there is not enough corporate entertainment money in the regional economy to support all of the area’s premium stadium seating. Indeed, the Fleet Center is reportedly having difficulty renewing premium seating packages that expired prior to this season. A glut of such seating will also reduce the price at which it can be sold.

In this suddenly competitive premium seating market, the lure of historic Fenway can provide the team with an edge over the region’s other sports franchises. There is no parallel to entertaining out of town clients at world-renowned Fenway Park, a fact which should help the team better attract suite lessees and club seat holders—and at a higher rate. In this way, Fenway Park is less susceptible to cyclical economic downturns.

Regardless of what the optimum number of luxury suites and club seats may be, and even though Fenway’s premium seating revenues are at about the major league average, the current level is almost certainly less than optimal for the team. Accordingly, all renovation plans call for the addition of more luxury suites (bringing the total to as many as 98) and club seats (bringing the total to as many as 5300).

An interesting approach developed by Wood + Zapata Architects calls for the construction of dozens of luxury suites above the portion of the left field grandstand that is angled in toward home plate. This approach achieves several things simultaneously. The suites are not overly intrusive at this location, nor are they far from the infield. Coupled with a single tier of suites extending from right field to short left, they more than double the number of existing suites. The use of a single tier throughout most of the park keeps upper level seating above the suites closer to the field than in today’s standard double-tiered configuration. The left field suites can be constructed in the off-season so that current luxury suite tenants can be accommodated.

* Among non-game receipt revenue Fenway Park’s concessions, parking and naming rights revenues are relatively weak. Since Fenway is at about the median for non-game receipt revenue (See Chart I) it follows that other categories of non-game receipt revenue, premium seating revenues and in-stadium advertising, are at least average for major league stadiums.
dated in these suites while the existing suites are being renovated or reconstructed. The Wood + Zapata plan brings the total number of suites to 98, the Llanes plan would raise the total to 67 and the Decker plan to 75.34

There are many creative proposals to increase the number of club seats. One general feature of today’s club seating areas is that they are set apart from general admission seating with separate amenities (restrooms, concession stands, restaurants, bars). For this reason renovation plans place thousands of new club seats in newly constructed sections above the ballpark’s luxury suites with the usual complement of amenities servicing this new tier. A portion of the lower seating bowl just behind home plate is often designated and serviced as premium seating in new stadiums, and the same can be done at Fenway Park. The Llanes plan also adds 400+ seats above the Green Monster that can be supported by the existing light stanchions without impacting Lansdowne Street below. The unique appeal and vantage accorded these seats (not to mention the lure of souvenir baseballs) dictate that they too could be sold at a significant premium. The Wood + Zapata plan brings the total number of club seats to 5300, the Llanes plan would raise the total to 4500 and the Decker plan to 5000.

Luxury suites and club seats can be added to Fenway Park for far less than the cost of a new stadium, while Fenway’s historic appeal can help attract more premium seat patrons at higher rates.

**Increasing Capacity & Comfort:** Fenway is comfortable enough “as is” to have broken all-time attendance records in each of the last two seasons and is big enough “as is” to provide the team with extraordinarily large revenues. Still, many would like to see an increase in seating capacity, more comfortable seating and more modern amenities at the ballpark. Adding concession points-of-sale as described above would provide fans with a wider array of merchandise and food offerings and shorter lines. The use of contiguous land for stadium facilities would also allow for the addition of restrooms; kitchens could be constructed in these areas to provide freshly prepared food at the ballpark. In the seating area the largest constraint is shoulder room (the difference between the more comfortable red seats and the 1934 blue seats in Fenway today is not legroom – the tread depth is the same in both areas – but seat width). All renovation plans call for the replacement of the existing narrow seats with wider more comfortable seats. Some, including the Llanes plan, would also reconstruct the existing grandstand to provide a deeper tread and more legroom.
Providing wider, more comfortable seats in the grandstand raises an issue, however. With wider seats there will be a reduction in the total number of seats and this will negatively impact revenues and the number of fans that can come to enjoy a game at the ballpark. Some of these seats will be made up by the increase in premium seating. Also, as mentioned earlier, 400+ seats could be added above the Green Monster. Thousands more club seats can be added to the existing roof without major structural improvements as indicated by the Decker plan. Still more seats could be added above the existing (or a reconstructed) lower grandstand by replacing the existing roof with a new upper tier (the Llanes and Wood + Zapata plans both include this feature). In each of these two designs the upper tier would be constructed in such a way as to be structurally independent of the existing lower grandstand, allowing for more seating than can be achieved using the existing roof structure. As many as 43,000 total seats (Wood + Zapata) could be attained in this way.

Like the optimum number of luxury suites, optimal seating capacity is a matter of some debate. The conventional wisdom is that because Fenway is smaller than other baseball stadiums, it is inadequate. But with third-in-the-majors net stadium revenues it is not economically inadequate, and having accommodated more than 2.6 million fans last season it is not functionally inadequate. Its smaller size means that fans are right in on the action, not towering above it. Most fans are close enough to sense players’ emotions, judge body language and see facial expressions. Because of Fenway’s close-to-the-field seating and renown fans are willing to pay more for the experience. Fenway’s iconic status costs the team nothing but provides the team with extra revenue on each ticket sold.
Additionally, a smaller stadium costs less to operate; more of each dollar of ticket revenue goes toward net revenue and less toward operations. Not only did Fenway surpass all new stadiums in game receipts in 2001, but it also probably had lower operational costs per dollar of ticket revenue. The greatly increased size of the proposed Boylston Street stadium, for example, meant that the Red Sox anticipated that twenty percent of all additional revenues generated by the new stadium would go to pay increases in “stadium operating, marketing, ticketing and general administrative expenses.”

Another indication of lower operating costs is the fact that the Red Sox currently have the lowest non-payroll expense to income ratio in Major League Baseball.

Many teams have felt compelled to turn their new stadiums into theme parks and shopping emporiums to draw more fans. Fenway’s history, however, has proven to be an even more powerful draw. A too large expansion with too many distracting elements could harm the team’s ability to benefit from the baseball focus that makes Fenway special and draws crowds year after year. The most efficient renovation would concentrate spending on just those features that would bring the greatest return.

In many ways, therefore, a smaller park may actually be a better park. Still, although the need for additional seating and attractions at Fenway may be less than conventional wisdom dictates, Fenway Park surely can be made more comfortable for fans and can be expanded to accommodate an adequate number of additional seats. Indeed, all programs that would be addressed by a new stadium (concessions, premium seating, fan comfort and capacity) can be adequately addressed through renovation, at less cost, with lower debt, years earlier and without jeopardizing existing revenues and team prestige.

Less and less kids get to experience the major league or high minors close-up, so they don’t come to appreciate all of the nuances and sights and sounds that make a day at the ballpark so exciting. They won’t become fans. And they won’t pass the game on…in the long run the new stadiums aren’t better for fans, aren’t better for the communities, and ultimately aren’t better for the game.

Tom Goldstein, Editor, Elysian Fields Quarterly
Auxiliary Sources of Revenue

It is sometimes stated that a new stadium is needed to increase naming rights, in-stadium advertising and parking revenues, but addressing these sources does not require a new stadium or a renovation.

**Naming Rights:** Fenway Park’s mythic status is worth far more in game receipts than the team could ever hope to obtain through selling naming rights to a new stadium. The most lucrative of baseball’s naming rights deals is worth $2.5 million per year for the Arizona Diamondbacks, while historic Fenway Park outpaced Bank One Ballpark by $43 million in game receipts in 2001. In essence, the “Fenway Park” brand and the associations it carries are actually worth more to the Red Sox than the naming rights fees paid to other franchises. The name “Fenway Park” obviously has far more value for the Red Sox than the name “Municipal Stadium” had for the Cleveland Indians because it lends the team a unique status as a symbol of continuity and baseball tradition. In recognition of the value of the unique “Fenway Park” brand the Red Sox actually proposed naming their Boylston Street replica stadium… “Fenway Park.” Of course, if the Red Sox want to sell naming rights there is no reason to believe that rights to a renovated Fenway Park would bring any less than rights to a new stadium.

**In-Stadium Advertising:** With new and highly visible advertisements by Coca-Cola, Hood, Fleet and John Hancock, the Red Sox have already tapped into this component of stadium revenue in a very substantial way. It is unclear why observers sometimes say a new stadium is needed to increase advertising revenues. The most lucrative in-stadium advertising deal to date is held by the Yankees who have provided Adidas with the opportunity to place its logo throughout 80-year-old Yankee Stadium.

**Parking:** The Red Sox currently control little of the parking revenues generated by Fenway Park. This situation is not due to any deficiency of the ballpark itself, however, and therefore, can and should be addressed separately. The Red Sox could increase their parking revenues by purchasing lots near the stadium, or, as was envisioned by the Boylston Street stadium legislation, have the government build a parking garage with the government sharing the parking revenue with the team. Regardless of whether the parking solution is tied to a new stadium or a renovation, it must be arrived at through consultation with the neighboring community.
New Englanders Favor Fenway Park Renovation

One of the risks of building a new stadium is a resulting loss of public interest in a franchise that leaves familiar confines and an authentic legacy for the homogenous world of corporate franchises playing in “retro” stadiums. We need look no further than the experience of the White Sox and Tigers to witness this dynamic. Opinion polls consistently show overwhelming majority support for renovation of Fenway Park. People love Fenway and would like to see it upgraded, not replaced. In fact, Fenway Park is the number one tourist draw in Massachusetts. Who has not hosted an out of town visitor who placed Fenway Park at the top of his or her list of Boston destinations?

A Red Sox official recently noted: “The feedback we’ve gotten [on the Wood + Zapata renovation plan] is very positive. The reason John Harrington decided to recreate Fenway in his plan is that the overwhelming majority of the fans we surveyed said that’s what they want – Fenway Park.” The demise of the Boylston Street stadium indicates that giving the fans what they want entails staying at Fenway Park, not building a replica. The Red Sox should heed what their fans are saying; acting against public sentiment may further alienate fans who are already uncomfortable with the corporate take-over of American sports.
Polling Data on Renovation of Fenway Park

**Item 1**: WBZ-TV “FastTrack” Poll of 500 Red Sox fans reported on WBZ-TV on March 31, 2002
- 65% say renovate Fenway
- 28% favor a new stadium
- 7% say not sure

**Item 2**: WBZ-TV “FastTrack” Poll of 500 residents in greater Boston reported on WBZ-TV on June 14, 2001
- 57% say renovate Fenway
- 18% say leave Fenway as it is
- 22% say build a new stadium

**Item 3**: WBZ-TV “FastTrack” Poll reported on WBZ-TV Sunday News Conference, March 4, 2001. John Henning reports:
- 74% would like to see Fenway restored

**Item 4**: WBZ-TV “FastTrack” Poll asking 500 Commonwealth residents “Which is a better location for a new ballpark” (WBZ-TV News Conference, July 15, 2001)
- 63% say the Fenway
- 28% say the Waterfront

**Item 5**: Survey USA random dialing poll on May 19, 2000 (just after the Red Sox released their financial plan for a new stadium)
- 58% say renovate Fenway
- 39% say build a new stadium

**Item 6**: Boston Herald poll of 412 Massachusetts registered voters conducted by RKM Research and Communications on May 17 & 18, 1999:
- All respondents (412)
  - 49% say renovate Fenway
  - 31% say build a new ballpark
  - 20% say neither or have no opinion

- Among those who consider themselves Sox fans (276)
  - 51% say renovate Fenway
  - 39% say build a new ballpark
  - 10% say neither or have no opinion

**Item 7**: Beacon Hill Institute (at Suffolk University) scientific survey of 400 Massachusetts registered voters conducted by Commonwealth Consulting Inc. on January 21, 1998 asked: “If the Red Sox were to receive public funds for a stadium, should the funds be used to renovate Fenway Park or build a new stadium?”
- 58% preferred renovating Fenway Park
- 20% preferred a new stadium
- 21% offered no opinion
Fenway Park Makes For Good Television

“Fenway Park is a terrific venue for a televised baseball game. It’s historic, having long ago achieved shrine status among baseball fans. It’s filled with enthusiastic sign-toting fans. In short, it’s a director’s dream.”

Bill Griffith, Boston Globe, August 14, 2001

Today, media revenues are of ever increasing significance to major league franchises, but this does not mean that a team’s ballpark cannot be important for generating media revenues. Fenway Park is a media darling – the most picturesque and identifiable baseball venue in the world. It is not only a great park in which to experience a game in person, but the excitement of a game at this special place translates well on television. The baseball tradition embodied by Fenway Park makes for a television product that is attractive to cable and satellite networks that reach far beyond New England. A Red Sox-Rangers game at Fenway Park will draw more viewers, all other things being equal, than a game between the two clubs at The Ballpark in Arlington. A legendary ballpark brings higher ratings, and higher ratings bring higher revenues.

Sox announcer Ned Martin spoke to the masses and delivered the word, “He swings, long drive to left field. If it stays fair it’s gone...Home Run! The Red Sox win and the Series is tied.”
Renovation Brings More Revenue More Quickly

The three renovation plans indicate that renovation could be accomplished in from three to five years. A new stadium would certainly take longer than this. The Boylston Street stadium, for example, took years from concept to design, well over a year for the passage of legislation after the concept design was announced and at least a year in a failed attempt to get financing. Who knows how long it would have taken to receive Boston City Council approval, seize property by eminent domain, beat back a slew of lawsuits, clear the seized land and construct the actual stadium? Still worse for the team, any one of these hurdles could prove fatal.

Lawrence M. Baer, who has experience getting a new stadium off the ground as Vice President of the San Francisco Giants, recalls that it took the Giants seven years to get Pac Bell Park approved and financed and another four years to build. Mr. Baer believes a new Red Sox stadium could take ten to twelve years. This would mean a ten to twelve year delay in new revenues for the team.
The entire basis underlying the recent rush to construct new baseball stadiums is public funding. With one exception, all new stadiums have been paid for entirely or almost entirely by local government. Only the San Francisco Giants have paid for their own stadium, and they were replacing famously frigid Candlestick Park, not famously friendly Fenway Park. The Giants also have an absolutely enormous annual stadium debt payment to make.\(^{41}\)

When local government builds a new stadium to replace an unloved and under-performing venue and allows the team to keep the new stadium revenues, the team can indeed benefit. But this is not the case in Boston. Not only is the local political climate cool to stadium subsidies, but because Fenway Park is currently third in baseball in net revenues, the Red Sox would need an incredibly large subsidy, certainly the largest ever, to make a new stadium more attractive than staying at Fenway Park. Also contributing to the size of the required subsidy are high land and construction costs in Boston. If the Boylston Street stadium proposal is any guide, the total project cost of a new stadium will be at least $664 million – more than twice the cost of a straight-forward renovation, and more expensive than any baseball stadium built to date.\(^{42}\)

When the Boylston Street stadium legislation was enacted, the Commonwealth was experiencing annual budget surpluses. Now, the days of substantial state budget deficits have returned and the City of Boston is also dealing with reduced tax receipts.\(^{43}\) State government is slashing numerous programs and laying off state workers. Senate Ways and Means Chairman Mark C. Montigny recently noted the changed economic climate since passage of the Boylston Street legislation.\(^{44}\) The Mayor of Boston made it clear in a recent article that subsidies are off the table and urged the team to renovate instead.\(^{45}\) Several local columnists in the *Boston Globe* have recently weighed in against ballpark subsidies.\(^{46}\) Obtaining local government funding for what could be the largest public stadium subsidy ever in these times will be a daunting task — especially since Fenway Park is so economically viable, the team has one of baseball’s highest payrolls, and since the team can address its needs through a less expensive renovation requiring no government land takings.

Further limiting the likelihood of a publicly funded stadium is the fact that no city has placed public funds toward the destruction of a ballpark that is its number one tourist draw. Nor has any city placed public funds toward the destruction of a ballpark that is one of its signature landmarks.
In October 2001, the Boston City Council passed a resolution rejecting eminent domain land takings and the use of public funds for the planned Boylston Street stadium by a vote of 7 to 6. Because a vote of two-thirds of the Council is needed to take land or expend city funds only five councilors are needed to block stadium land acquisition or city funding of a new stadium. And even with City Council approval, lawsuits could block any land taking; eminent domain land takings for private sports facilities are unconstitutional in Massachusetts.

These obstacles seem almost insurmountable and would certainly dramatically lengthen the time it would take the team to attain new revenues with a new stadium but there is yet another new stadium risk that can be averted through renovation. Public wrath is stirred up when professional sports teams seek special benefits. By seeking taxpayer funds in the construction of a stadium, the team pits itself against those who would reduce government spending and taxes as well as those who desire well-funded social programs and schools. Thus, taxpayer subsidized stadiums offend both the political right and the political left. Preserving Fenway, on the other hand, can be a public relations bonanza for the team.
Obstacles To Renovation Can Be Controlled

The major reported obstacles to renovation are Fenway’s structural integrity and the logistical problem of playing in a ballpark that is undergoing modernization. Unlike the political obstacles to constructing a new stadium outlined in Reason 10 above, these structural and logistical obstacles are within the control of the team and can be handled through prudent planning and management. Coupled with the tremendous risks inherent in replacing Fenway with a new stadium, the overwhelming benefits of renovation far outweigh these difficulties.

Structurally Viable. Investigation has shown that the present structure of Fenway Park is sound and can last for decades with proper maintenance. The ability of the existing foundations to take the load of new additional structure is quite limited, however. Accordingly, each renovation plan is careful to place most new construction on new foundations that are independent of the existing ballpark structure. In this way Fenway is added to without stressing the existing grandstand.

Logistically Viable. An important part of any renovation is the construction phasing plan. This breaks down the project into phases and shows what activities will be undertaken when. This is the key to ensuring that renovation can proceed while the team continues to play its games at Fenway Park.

It has often been written that phasing the renovation of Fenway Park would be impossible, but professionals in the field have found otherwise. The Decker plan is the least elaborate and is easily accomplished almost exclusively during off-season periods. The Llanes plan reconstructs the most and is the most difficult to stage. A professional construction manager has created a workable construction phasing plan for this project that is attached as Appendix C.1. The Wood + Zapata design also contains a construction phasing plan that allows renovation to proceed while the team plays at Fenway Park.
Larry Lucchino, incoming President of the Boston Red Sox, discussed the phasing of the Wood + Zapata plan on Boston’s WEEI radio on January 10, 2002:

“The plan calls for limited renovation during the course of the season and extensive work done in the off season, but we do play right through. Now there’s a reduction in capacity in one or two of those years of three or four thousand seats...we get down to about 28 or 29 thousand seats for a couple of years, and that is a problem. But I will tell you very quickly that we worked through an expansion of Qualcomm Stadium in San Diego in 1996 and 1997, and there was an expansion for about 75 to 80 million dollars (largely for football, but it certainly took place during the baseball season), and we were able to get through it. Cincinnati played in essentially a construction zone of sorts this year....so it can happen, but you’ve got to be careful about that and make sure that it is doable....”
Conclusions

“The preservation movement has one great curiosity. There is never retrospective controversy or regret. Preservationists are the only people in the world who are invariably confirmed in their wisdom after the fact.”

John Kenneth Galbraith

Fenway Park is a unique ballpark, the Red Sox are a unique franchise and together they lend Boston an equally unique charm. Accordingly, a unique approach to providing for our baseball team applies. At its heart, renovation is about imagining something even better than the present-day Fenway Park—a more comfortable Fenway with added amenities but with the same awe-inspiring presence and intimacy. Fenway was the inspiration for many of the new stadiums constructed during the past ten years. The declining attendance at these stadiums, however, proves that you can’t recreate the Fenway magic in a new facility.

With renovation the Red Sox franchise benefits in many ways.

◆ Renovation will increase Fenway Park’s already extraordinary revenues.
◆ Renovation will allow the team to maintain and build upon its powerful legacy.
◆ Renovation is significantly less expensive and much more certain to succeed.
◆ Renovation will bring the team new revenues much sooner.
◆ Renovation will avoid a public battle over stadium subsidies.
◆ Renovation is popular and will provide the team with a public relations boost.
◆ Renovation will not jeopardize Fenway’s currently strong drawing power.
◆ Renovation is cost efficient – rather than acquiring acres of new land and building an entirely new stadium the team would add just the features likely to bring a financial return.

Renovation benefits fans who love historic Fenway as well as fans who seek modern stadium amenities and comfort. The sport of baseball will be enriched by the preservation of a living symbol of its distinguished past. Properly done, a renovated Fenway will undeniably be the best baseball venue in the world.

With renovation, the City of Boston holds on to a celebrated landmark, a piece of its proud history and a place dear to its heart. Local businesses and the local economy continue to profit from retention of the number one tourist draw in Massachusetts. With renovation, the country maintains a rare living connection to the rise of sports culture in twentieth century America.

Renovation is the surest way to enhance the team’s competitiveness without diminishing ourselves, our team, and our city.
In the end, only renovation offers the possibility of attaining a singular accomplishment. When Camden Yards was built in 1992 it was a groundbreaking event. While the sixteenth Camden Yards sequel could never be considered ground-breaking, a spectacular renovation of Fenway would surely be an historic undertaking.

This is a defining moment, a rare opportunity to achieve something outstanding and memorable and of lasting significance. We can trade in something special for something ordinary or we can strive for better. Replacing Fenway Park would only diminish us; renovation would make a great ballpark, a great team and a great city even greater.
Notes


6. Healy, Beth. “Now comes the hard part: complex financing is key to getting ballpark built,” Boston Globe, July 27, 2000, p. E1. In 1999 the Red Sox announced plans to build a new baseball stadium on Boylston Street in Boston’s Fenway neighborhood. The previous owners could not find financing for the team’s share of the project expense and plans for this new stadium have been shelved.


11. Skydome opened in 1989, but for only part of the season.


21. See Chart I.

23 See Chart 1.

24 Morgan, Jon. “Chill in Detroit: Comerica Park’s empty seats should give pause to all in the game who believe a new park is an automatic ticket to a brighter future.” Baltimore Sun, June 30, 2001.


36 See www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/stories/2001-12-05-focus-expenses.htm. (Total Operating Expenses less Player Compensation and Benefit Plan divided by Total Operating Revenue.)


39 For example, NESN’s move to AT&T Broadband basic cable service last year is estimated to bring the team from $10 million to $15 million annually, almost as much as the $19 million the team hoped to realize from the proposed Boylston Street stadium. Vaillancourt, Meg, “AT&T Broadband will hike cable rates 8.7%,” Boston Globe, November 22, 2001.


“Places of the heart, even impure ones, are worth the effort. Your home, your neighborhood, your city—you have to defend your piece of ground. Manufactured, mediated experience is ubiquitous. Battling to preserve a special place is not quaint provincialism. It is defiance against the relentless obliteration of memory and community.”

Michael Betzold

This document was prepared for the Red Sox, their fans, local political, business and community leaders and Bostonians everywhere by Save Fenway Park!, a non-profit organization committed to keeping Fenway Park the home of the Red Sox for years to come. For more information or to become a member please call, write or e-mail us by visiting www.SaveFenwayPark.org.

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Full color copies of this report with all accompanying appendices are available for $20 by U.S. priority mail. This report and appendices are also available online at www.SaveFenwayPark.org/homefield.html. The site will also include post-publication discussion and new information on the topic.